Human Rights Commission asked to uphold right to information in Chile by -
 Page 1 of 26 
 
IN THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 
Case No. 12.108 
 






WRITTEN COMMENTS OF: 
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ARTICLE 19, GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION 
LIBERTAD DE INFORMACIÓN MEXICO 
INSTITUTO PRENSA Y SOCIEDAD 
 
I.  Introduction 
1. The signatory organizations respectfully submit this amicus curiae brief for the 
benefit of the Commission’s consideration of the salient issues raised by the above-
referenced case. 
2. The Justice Initiative pursues law reform activities grounded in the protection of 
human rights, and contributes to the development of legal capacity for open societies. 
It has offices in New York (United States), Budapest (Hungary) and Abuja (Nigeria). 
Among its activities, the Justice Initiative prepares legal submissions for national and 
international courts and tribunals on questions of law where its expertise may be of 
assistance. In the area of access to information, the Justice Initiative has extensive 
experience in promoting the adoption and implementation of freedom of information 
laws in Eastern Europe, Latin America and elsewhere. It has also contributed to 
international standard-setting and monitoring of government transparency around the 
world. As an organization that promotes the highest international standards of 
freedom of expression and information, the Justice Initiative has a particular interest 
in the questions raised by this case.  
3. ARTICLE 19, Global Campaign for Free Expression, is an international human rights 
NGO, based in London but with offices in different regions of the world, including in 
Mexico City. Taking its name from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, ARTICLE 19 works globally to protect and promote the right to freedom of 
expression, including access to information and the means of communication. 
ARTICLE 19 is well known for its authoritative work in elaborating the implications 
of the guarantee of freedom of expression in different thematic areas. It has particular 
expertise in the area of access to information. In June 1999, ARTICLE 19 published 
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The Public’s Right to Know: Principles on Freedom of Information Legislation,1 a set 
of principles on international standards and best comparative practice relating to 
access to information legislation. In July 2001, it published A Model Freedom of 
Information Law,2 which translates the Principles into legislative form.  
4. Libertad de Información Mexico, Associación Civil (LIMAC) promotes and defends 
the right of access to public information at federal and local levels in Mexico, 
including through strategic litigation. LIMAC is also a leading promoter of 
government transparency efforts in Latin America. In particular, it has provided 
assistance for the adoption and implementation of freedom of information laws in 
several countries of the region (Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay and 
Peru). As an organization committed to the promotion of the right to information at 
the international level, LIMAC takes a strong interest in the issues presented by this 
case. 
5. Instituto Prensa y Sociedad of Peru (Press and Society Institute, IPYS) defends and 
promotes freedom of the press, and freedom of expression and information in Peru 
and Latin America. IPYS pursues these goals through a range of activities, including 
litigation at the local and international levels. In addition, IPYS works to enhance 
government transparency and civil empowerment in the region. Since 1999, IPYS has 
engaged in systematic monitoring of freedom of expression and information 
throughout the continent, through its network of correspondents in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
6. The present case before this Commission raises issues of great significance for the 
development of freedom of information law in the Americas and beyond. Both this 
Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have underscored the 
importance of the free exchange of information and ideas for the healthy development 
and safeguarding of democracy. However, the Commission and the Court have not 
had thus far an opportunity to fully consider the question of whether the American 
Convention of Human Rights (“the Convention”) guarantees a right of general access 
to state-held information. 
7. That is the central issue addressed by this brief, which draws on relevant international 
and comparative law and practice from the Americas and other leading jurisdictions. 
It is on the basis of these standards that we consider the scope of the right to 
information, and the principles that underlie its protection under the Convention and 
international human rights law. The brief then discusses whether Chile has complied 
with its Convention obligations to guarantee freedom of information, both generally 
and with respect to the specific case at issue.  
 
                                                 
1  (London: ARTICLE 19, 1999). Available at: http://www.article19.org/docimages/512.htm. 
 
2  (London: ARTICLE 19, 2001). Available at: http://www.article19.org/docimages/1112.htm. 
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II.  Discussion 
A.  Summary of Facts 
8. The present case involves the denial by the Chilean authorities of a request for 
information by three Chilean citizens, Marcel Claude Reyes, Sebastian Cox Urrejola 
and Arturo Longton Guerrero (“victims”). Mr. Claude Reyes is an environmental 
academic and activist, who was at the time executive director of the Terram 
Foundation, a registered environmental group based in Santiago. Mr. Cox Urrejola is 
a human rights lawyer and executive director of FORJA, a civil society organization 
that promotes access to justice. Mr. Longton Guerrero was at the time a Member of 
the Chilean Parliament. 
9. The information at the center of this case was requested by the Terram Foundation on 
May 6, 1998, by means of a letter to the Chilean Foreign Investment Committee 
(“Committee”), an agency of the Chilean Executive. The Foundation’s request 
referred to information in the possession of the Committee related to its approval of a 
major logging project, known as the Condor River project, to be carried out by a 
subsidiary of the US-based forestry company then called Trillium Corporation (the 
company has since changed its name to Savia International). 
10. In the early 1990s, Trillium bought some 285,000 hectares of native timber land, 
knows as lenga, in the Chilean part of Tierra del Fuego. Shortly afterwards, Trillium 
proposed the Condor River project to the Chilean authorities, conducted an initial 
environmental impact assessment in 1995, and started harvesting the lenga in 1996. 
From the very beginning, however, the project met with strong opposition from 
Chilean and international environmental groups, which raised concerns about the 
project’s impact on the area’s fragile ecosystems and what they saw as Trillium’s 
poor record of sustainable logging in the United States and elsewhere. As a result, the 
Condor River project was halted several times between 1996 and early 1998, 
including once as a result of a Supreme Court order.  
11. It was under this state of affairs that the Terram Foundation filed a request for 
information collected by the Committee, which had vetted and approved Trillium’s 
preliminary foreign investment application, pursuant to Chilean law. The 
Committee’s information-gathering responsibilities under the law can be summarized 
as follows: 
 
a. collect and process the results of inspections carried out by other agencies regarding 
the applicant company’s compliance with its obligations under foreign investment 
laws; 
b. interact with other agencies that are required to provide information to the Committee 
or whose prior authorization is required before the Committee can authorize a foreign 
investment project; 
c. investigate both within and outside Chile the suitability and seriousness of the 
applicants; and 
d. solicit from other entities in the public and private sector any information and 
documentation that the Committee deems necessary for carrying out its functions. 
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12. Given the Committee’s powers, on May 6, 1998, the Terram Foundation requested 
access to several categories of documents and information that the Committee ought 
to possess in relation to the Condor River project. On May 19, 1998, Terram 
representatives met with the Vice President of the Committee, who agreed to provide 
information only on the amount of Trillium’s total investment, which was later 
provided to Terram by fax. Following the Committee’s failure to respond to the 
remaining requests, on June 3 and July 2, 1998, Terram sent two follow-up letters, 
which also went unanswered. The Committee reacted through a press statement, 
without providing any information, only after Mr. Claude Reyes and Mr. Longton 
Guerrero complained publicly about its non-responsiveness.  
13. It is undisputed by the parties that the Committee provided no information (nor, 
according to the petitioners, any reasons for its refusal to do so) with respect to 
Terram’s requests for the following data: 
 
a. any information collected by the Committee on Trillium’s track record, in order to 
satisfy itself of the company’s past seriousness and legitimacy; as well as its formal 
decision on Trillium’s application; 
b. any information in the possession of the Committee regarding Trillium’s compliance 
with its obligations under Chilean foreign investment laws, including as to any past 
violations; and 
c. any information collected from third parties in relation to the above. 
14. As a result, the victims filed three successive constitutional appeals against the 
Committee’s effective denial of their request in the domestic courts, claiming a 
violation of their right to information under the Chilean Constitution and the 
Convention. All appeals were summarily dismissed as “manifestly ill-founded,” 
including by the Chilean Supreme Court on July 31, 1998. 
15. On December 17, 1998, a group of nongovernmental organizations and Members of 
Parliament (“petitioners”) filed a petition on behalf of the victims with this 
Commission. The Commission declared the petition admissible on October 10, 2003.3 
B. Article 13 guarantees a right of access to state-held information 
16. This Commission has recognized that “access to information held by the state is a 
fundamental right of every individual.”4 The existence of such a right draws support 
from both the language and jurisprudence of Article 13 of the Convention, which 
guarantees everyone’s “freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of 
all kinds.” The Inter-American Court acknowledged early on that the Article 13 rights 
of listeners and receivers of information and ideas are on the same footing as the 
rights of the speaker: “For the average citizen it is at least as important to know the 
                                                 
3  Report No. 60/03. 
 
4 Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, adopted at the Commission’s 108th 
regular session, October 19, 2000, para. 4. 
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opinion of others or to have access to information generally as is the very right to 
impart his own opinion.”5 
17. In a modern democracy, a very significant part of the totality of information held by 
“others” is in the hands of the state. That body of information is produced, collected 
and processed using public resources and it ultimately belongs to the public. The 
government holds the information as a custodian for the public, and is under a general 
obligation to make it available to the citizenry, save when a compelling public or 
private interest dictates otherwise. As such, the right to access government 
information is an integral part of the Article 13 right to freedom of expression—a 
right that includes, in the words of the Inter-American Court, “the collective right to 
receive any information whatsoever.”6  
18. This Commission has already recognized certain aspects of states’ obligation to 
provide information in its jurisprudence, acknowledging, for example, that Article 13 
guarantees the “right to truth” about responsibility for serious human rights 
violations, a right to which corresponds a positive state obligation: 
the right to truth is founded in Articles 8 [right to a fair trial] and 25 [right to judicial 
protection] of the Convention, insofar as they are both “instrumental” in the judicial 
establishment of the facts and circumstances that surrounded the violation of a 
fundamental right. … [T]his right has its roots in Article 13 (1) of the Convention, 
because that article recognizes the right to seek and receive information. With regard 
to that article, … the State has the positive obligation to guarantee essential 
information to preserve the rights of the victims, to ensure transparency in public 
administration and the protection of human rights.7 
19. The right to access state-held information is further strengthened by its close 
connection to another fundamental right, enshrined in Article 23 of the Convention: 
“the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives.” In a democracy, citizens exercise their self-governance rights 
not only through free and periodic elections, but also through a myriad of other fora 
and means of influencing and interacting with those responsible for setting public 
policies. Both direct and indirect participation, during or outside election periods, 
would be greatly undermined by the lack of a general right of access to government 
information, and the resulting inability to follow and engage in government decision-
                                                 
5 Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, Advisory 
Opinion OC-5/85, November 13, 1985, para. 32. The Spanish version of this quote speaks of “informacion 
de que disponen otros,” literally “information available to others.” 
 
6  Id., para. 31. 
 
7 Barrios Altos Case (Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. v. Peru), Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Judgment of March 14, 2001, para. 45. The Court in this case considered it unnecessary to address the 
claims under Article 13, having held that Peru had violated Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention. 
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making. As the Inter-American Court has argued, “a society that is not well-informed 
is not a society that is truly free.”8 
20. It is important to note here that Chile does not appear to dispute the petitioners’ claim 
that there exists a general right of access to government information under the 
Convention. This is clear, inter alia, from this Commission’s report on the 
admissibility of this petition, which describes the position of the State beginning as 
follows: “The State argues that the Vice-President of the Committee on Foreign 
Investment complied with his obligations under Article 13 by providing some of the 
information requested by petitioners.”9 
Right to Information in State Practice 
21. The recognition of a fundamental right of access to state-held information is well 
supported by the current status of the right in state practice and international law. 
More than fifty countries around the world have adopted freedom of information laws 
(statutes) that provide for general access to government information.10 In the 
Americas, these include Belize, Canada, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United 
States of America. Over forty countries worldwide, including Colombia, Guatemala, 
Peru and Venezuela, have incorporated the right of access to public information into 
their constitutional bills of rights, formally recognizing its essential role in the proper 
functioning of a democratic system. 
22. At least seven countries in the Americas are currently considering proposals to enact 
national freedom of information laws.11 In 1999, one year after the filing of this 
petition with the Commission, Chile itself passed a law granting general access to the 
administrative acts of the state administration and their supporting documents.12 This 
indicates that a general right to government information is now the rule in the 
Americas, as in most of the rest of the democratic world. The general consensus of 
the Member States on this issue is most clearly revealed by the OAS General 
Assembly’s 2003 and 2004 resolutions on access to public information, both of which 
                                                 
8 Compulsory Membership Opinion, para. 70. 
 
9  Admissibility Report, para. 38. We will address below the State’s claim that the denial of access to the 
remaining information was supposedly justified for various reasons. 
 
10  David Banisar, Freedom of Information and Access to Government Record Laws Around the World, 
May 2004, available at www.freedominfo.org.  
 
11 These are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay. In some countries, 
such as Argentina and Mexico, provinces, municipalities and other sub-national entities have adopted acts 
that grant a general right of access to information in their possession. See “Report of the Office of the 
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression,” in Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (2003), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, Doc. 70 rev. 2. 
 
12  Id., para. 86. The law is known as Ley de Probidad Administrativa [Administrative Probity Act], no. 
19.653. 
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recognize the states’ obligation to “respect and promote respect for everyone’s access 
to public information”, which is deemed to be “a requisite for the very exercise of 
democracy.”13 
23. Even in the absence of explicit constitutional or statutory authorization, courts in 
several countries have upheld a fundamental right of access to information as a 
corollary of freedom of expression and participation rights. The Supreme Court of 
India addressed the issue in a case involving the government’s refusal to release intra-
agency correspondence regarding transfers and dismissals of judges. Recognizing a 
“right to know which seems implicit in the right of free speech and expression,” the 
Indian Court argued that, 
[w]here a society has chosen to accept democracy as its creedal faith, it is elementary 
that the citizens ought to know what their government is doing. The citizens have a 
right to decide by whom and by what rules they shall be governed and they are 
entitled to call on those who govern on their behalf to account for their conduct.  No 
democratic government can survive without accountability and the basic postulate of 
accountability is that the people should have information about the functioning of 
government. … The citizens’ right to know the facts, the true facts, about the 
administration of the country is thus one of the pillars of a democratic State.14 
24. The Constitutional Court of (South) Korea reached a similar conclusion in a 1989 
case involving a municipal office’s unjustified refusal to grant the applicant access to 
certain real estate records he had requested. The Korean Court argued that unhindered 
access to government information was essential to the “free formation of ideas,” 
which is itself a pre-condition for the realization of genuine freedom of expression 
and communication.15 This and subsequent freedom of information decisions of the 
Korean Court influenced the legislature to adopt in 1996 a comprehensive access to 
information law.16 
25. This approach has also been embraced by national courts in the Americas. Thus, the 
Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica held in a 2002 case that 
the Central Bank’s refusal to disclose a report of the International Monetary Fund, 
requested by a newspaper, violated the constitutional right to information “to the 
detriment of all Costa Rican citizens.” The Court reasoned that  
                                                 
13  In addition, the resolutions provide for the states’ obligation to “promote the adoption of any necessary 
legislative or other types of provisions to ensure [the right’s] recognition and effective application.”  
Resolution 1932 (XXXIII-O/03) on Access to Public Information: Strengthening Democracy, adopted on 
June 10, 2003; and Resolution 2057 (XXXIV-O/04) on Access to Public Information: Strengthening 
Democracy, adopted on June 8, 2004.  
 
14  S.P. Gupta v. Union of India [1982] AIR (SC) 149, at 232. 
 
15  Forests Survey Inspection Request Case, 1 KCCR 176 (September 4, 1989). A summary of the judgment 
is available at http://www.ccourt.go.kr/english/decision.htm.  
 
16  Disclosure of Information by Public Agencies Act (no. 5242), December 31, 1996. 
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the State must guarantee that information of a public character and importance is 
made known to the citizens, and, in order for this to be achieved, the State must 
encourage a climate of freedom of information. … In this way, the State … is the 
first to have an obligation to facilitate not only access to this information, but also its 
adequate disclosure and dissemination, and towards this aim, the State has the 
obligation to offer the necessary facilities and eliminate existing obstacles to its 
attainment.17 
In reaching its decision, the Costa Rican Court relied emphatically on the symbiotic 
relationship between the right to information and the rights of democratic 
participation, arguing that “the right to information … implicates the citizens’ 
participation in collective decision-making, which, to the extent that freedom of 
information is protected, guarantees the formation and existence of a free public 
opinion, which is the very pillar of a free and democratic society.”18 
Right to Information in International Law and Practice 
26. This Commission is not alone in recognizing the right of the public to receive 
generalized access to records and information in the hands of the state. So have the 
other two regional human rights mechanisms, confirming the global trend toward 
acceptance of the right as a basic individual and collective entitlement. In Europe, the 
main human rights organization of the continent, the Council of Europe, adopted its 
first recommendation on the right of access more than twenty years ago.19 In 2002, 
the Committee of Ministers adopted a new recommendation providing for a general 
right to access official documents in the following terms: 
Member states should guarantee the right of everyone to have access, on request, to 
official documents held by the public authorities. This principle should apply without 
discrimination on any ground, including national origin.20 
27. In the 25-member European Union, the Union’s bill of rights grants a right of access 
to documents held by Union institutions to “[a]ny citizen of the Union, and any 
natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State.”21 
                                                 
17  Navarro Gutiérrez v. Lizano Fait, Judgment of April 2, 2002, as translated in the 2003 Report of the 
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, 161.  
 
18  Id., para. VI. 
 
19 The 1981 recommendation provided that “[e]veryone within the jurisdiction of a member state shall have 
the right to obtain, on request, information held by the public authorities ….” Recommendation (81) 19 on 
Access to Information Held by Public Authorities, adopted by the Council of Ministers on November 25, 
1981. 
 
20  Recommendation (2002)2 on Access to Official Documents, February 21, 2002, para. III (emphasis 
added).  
 
21  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, December 7, 2000, art. 42. The Charter is not 
legally binding but can be invoked by EU and national courts. Since the adoption of the Charter, EU 
institutions have debated the need to make the Charter binding, which led to a decision to include a binding 
bill of rights in the new draft Constitution of the Union. 
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The EU’s new draft Constitution includes a similar right of access to Union 
documents, “in whatever form they are produced.”22 Considering that both the 
Charter and the draft Constitution are based on the constitutional traditions of the 
member states, the inclusion of the right of access to information therein suggests that 
this right has not only become ubiquitous, but is widely perceived as a fundamental 
right on the European continent. 
28. These recent developments notwithstanding, the European Court of Human Rights 
has not construed thus far a general right of access out of Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.23 The Court has recognized, however, a right to state-
held information under circumstances in which the denial of information affects the 
enjoyment of other Convention rights, such as the right to respect for private and 
family life, under Article 8 of the Convention. In Guerra v. Italy, a case brought by 
individuals living near a chemical factory in relation to the failure of the Italian 
authorities to inform them about the risks of potentially devastating accidents, the 
Court held that, under such circumstances, Article 8 imposed on states a positive 
obligation to inform. Failure to do so had left the applicants unable to assess the risks 
and make informed decisions about living near the hazardous facility.24 
29. As noted, the European Court did not consider Article 10 to be applicable in these 
cases. In Guerra, the Court ruled, in language similar to that employed in the earlier 
cases, that 
[the] freedom to receive information, referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 10 of the 
Convention, “basically prohibits a government from restricting a person from 
receiving information that others wish or may be willing to impart to him” .... That 
freedom cannot be construed as imposing on a State, in circumstances such as those 
of the present case, positive obligations to collect and disseminate information of its 
own motion.25 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
22  Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, adopted by the European Convention on 13 June 
and 10 July 2003, arts. 49 and II-42. 
 
23  Article 10 provides, in the relevant part, that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression. This 
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authorities and regardless of frontiers.” 
 
24  Guerra and Others v. Italy, Judgment of February 19, 1998. The Court found that similar positive 
obligations existed in Gaskin v. United Kingdom, Judgment of July 7, 1989 (involving refused access to 
case records to an adult who had been in the care of the local authorities as a child); and McGinley and 
Egan v. United Kingdom, Judgment of June 9, 1998 (involving refused access to records regarding the 
potential health hazards resulting from nuclear radiation tests to which the applicants had been exposed 
while serving in the British army). 
 
25 Guerra, para. 53 (references omitted, emphasis added). Three concurring opinions touched on this issue: 
Judge Palm, joined by five other judges, agreed that Article 10 was not applicable to this particular case, 
but in so doing “put strong emphasis on the factual situation at hand, not excluding that under different 
circumstances the State may have a positive obligation to make available information to the public and to 
disseminate such information which by its nature could not otherwise come to the knowledge of the 
public.” Judge Jambrek considered that Article 10 creates a positive obligation for the State only “when a 
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Relying in part on the nuances of opinion within the Court, various commentators 
have argued that, by qualifying its holding with respect to the circumstances of each 
individual case, the Court has left the door open to interpretations of Article 10 that 
might recognize a right of access in other factual situations. The Venice Commission, 
the Council of Europe’s authoritative advisory body on constitutional matters, 
reached the following conclusion in a 2000 opinion: 
the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights has not yet given a clear answer 
as to whether Article 10 entails a general obligation for the authorities to disseminate 
information of their own motion. It would seem to imply, however, an obligation to 
provide information on request, subject, of course, to the limitations set forth in 
Article 10 para 2 of the Convention.26 
The Venice Commission thus highlighted the distinction between an unqualified right 
to proactive dissemination of information by the State, in the absence of any request, 
and a right to information in response to a specific request by an individual or group. 
In the latter situation, which is analogous to the facts of the present case against 
Chile, Article 10 would give rise, in the opinion of the Venice Commission, to a right 
of access and a corresponding obligation for the state. 
30. In assessing the relevance of the European Court’s case law, we would respectfully 
bring to the attention of this Commission two important differences in the respective 
textual bases. First, Article 10 of the European Convention is cast in negative terms, 
guaranteeing the freedom to receive information and ideas “without interference by 
public authority”—in other words, a freedom of primarily horizontal exchanges 
among individuals and other private entities that should not be disturbed by the state. 
This conceptual approach chosen by the drafters may underlie, to some extent, the 
apparent ambiguity of the European Court in relation to the general right of access to 
official information.27 
                                                                                                                                                 
person of his/her own will demands/requests information which is at the disposal of the government at the 
material time.” Judge Thor Vilhjalmsson, in a partly dissenting opinion, was of the view that Article 10 
should have been applied and expressed agreement with the European Commission, which argued in the 
same case that 
 
the provision of information to the public was now one of the essential means of protecting the 
well-being and health of the local population in situations in which the environment was at risk. 
Consequently, the words “This right shall include freedom ... to receive … information...” in 
paragraph 1 of Article 10 had to be construed as conferring an actual right to receive information, 
in particular from the relevant authorities, on members of local populations who had been or might 
be affected by an industrial or other activity representing a threat to the environment. Id., para. 52. 
 
26  European Commission for Democracy Through Law, “Consolidated Opinion on Freedom of Expression 
and Freedom of Access to Information as Guaranteed in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 
CDL (2000) 78, October 2, 2000, para. 16. The Commission’s analysis was in response to a question put by 
the Bosnian authorities as to whether the freedom of expression guarantees of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement—which incorporated by reference the European Convention on Human Rights—included a 
right of access to information. 
 
27 The European Court has recognized, however, that Article 10 may create positive obligations for the state 
in other contexts. For example, in Ozgur Gundem v. Turkey the Court held that Turkey’s failure to take 
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31. That is not the case, however, with Article 13 of the American Convention, which 
guarantees the free exchange of information and ideas in general terms, without any 
reference to the intervention of the state.28 Article 13 has been consistently interpreted 
by the Convention bodies as guaranteeing more than a purely negative freedom from 
government interference. This is evident in the Inter-American Court’s embracing the 
notion of the collective right of the public to be informed and in this Commission’s 
recognition of the right to truth (and the corresponding obligations of the state). A 
general right of access to state-held information is a logical component of the right of 
the citizenry to be informed, to be able to participate meaningfully in governance and 
to hold the government accountable. 
32. In addition, both the text and the jurisprudence of Article 13 indicate that the state has 
certain positive obligations to act to secure freedom of expression and information. 
Thus, paragraph 3 of Article 13 provides that this freedom “may not be restricted by 
indirect methods or means”, including the “abuse of … private controls over 
newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies or equipment used in the dissemination of 
information.” In this context, the Inter-American Court has noted that 
Article 13(3) does not only deal with indirect governmental restrictions, it also 
expressly prohibits “private controls” producing the same result. This provision must 
be read together with the language of Article 1 of the Convention wherein the States 
Parties “undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized (in the Convention) 
... and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of 
those rights and freedoms ….” Hence, a violation of the Convention in this area can 
be the product not only of the fact that the State itself imposes restrictions of an 
indirect character which tend to impede “the communication and circulation of ideas 
and opinions,” but the State also has an obligation to ensure that the violation does 
not result from the “private controls” referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 13.29 
Such an obligation includes perforce a positive duty to act to eliminate any private 
barriers to free and pluralistic communication. The same fundamental interest in the 
free circulation of ideas and information requires the state to act to make available its 
own information to the citizenry.  
33. Secondly, unlike Article 10 of the European Convention, Article 13 of the American 
Convention provides for the freedom to seek, as well as receive and impart, 
information and ideas of all kinds. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also 
contain the word “seek” in their formulations. Unfortunately, the drafting history of 
Article 13 appears to shed little light on the original understanding of the freedom to 
                                                                                                                                                 
steps to protect a newspaper from attacks perpetrated by private persons violated Article 10. Judgment of 
March 16, 2000, paras. 44-45. 
 
28 That is not to say, of course, that freedom of information is an absolute right; the present discussion 
relates to the nature of the right, not its contours. 
 
29  Compulsory Membership Opinion, para. 48. 
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seek information and ideas.30 However, as the OAS Special Rapporteur has 
observed,31 the practice of the States Parties, described above, in the decades 
following adoption of the Convention, and the progressive interpretation of 
Convention Articles 13 and 23 by this Commission and the Court would allow, and 
indeed logically require, recognition of a general right to seek information held by the 
state. 
34. At the regional level, the right of access to government information has also been 
recognized by this Commission’s African counterpart. The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights has not yet had an opportunity to decide, in its 
adjudication procedure, whether the Banjul Charter grants a right of access to official 
information. The Commission has nevertheless held, like its Inter-American 
counterparts, that Article 9 of the Charter protects not only the free speech rights of 
the speaker, but also the rights of those interested in receiving information and ideas. 
Thus, in a case against Gambia, the Commission held that the politically motivated 
harassment and intimidation of journalists not only deprived them “of their rights to 
freely express and disseminate their opinions, but also the public, of the right to 
information.”32 
35. More recently, the African Commission expressed its position, and its interpretation 
of Article 9, on the right to information in its Declaration of Principles on Freedom 
of Expression in Africa, which contains a comprehensive statement of the principles 
applicable in this area. Principle IV of the Declaration provides as follows: 
1. Public bodies hold information not for themselves but as custodians of the public 
good and everyone has a right to access this information, subject only to clearly 
defined rules established by law. 
2. The right to information shall be guaranteed by law in accordance with the 
following principles: everyone has the right to access information held by public 
bodies; everyone has the right to access information held by private bodies which 
is necessary for the exercise or protection of any right ….33 
36. The 53-member Commonwealth has also supported the right to information over 
more than two decades, starting with the 1980 Barbados Communiqué of its Law 
                                                 
30  See 2003 Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, p. 144, note 38. According to the 




32 Sir Dawda K. Jawara v. The Gambia, Decision of May 11, 2000, para. 65. Article 9 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights provides: “1. Every individual shall have the right to receive 
information. 2. Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the 
law.” 
 
33  Adopted at the 32nd Ordinary Session, October 17-23, 2002, Banjul, Gambia. 
 
 Page 13 of 26 
Ministers.34 In 1999 the Commonwealth adopted a statement of Freedom of 
Information Principles, which encouraged its member countries to “regard freedom of 
information as a legal and enforceable right” and to establish “a presumption in favor 
of disclosure.”35 
37. This overview of comparative and international law and practice shows that the right 
of access to official information has become widely accepted in the democratic world, 
including in the Americas, as a fundamental human right. Whether as part of 
traditional free expression guarantees or as a basic entitlement in its own right, it is 
perceived as an integral and imperative component of the broader right to democratic 
governance. Indeed, any arguments to the effect that the citizenry should not have a 
right to know what their government knows and does, subject only to compelling 
exceptions, smack of authoritarianism. As the three specialized mandates on freedom 
of expression have noted, 
[i]mplicit in the freedom of expression is the public’s right to open access to 
information and to know what governments are doing on their behalf, without which 
truth would languish and people’s participation in government would remain 
fragmented.36 
The Special Regime of the Right to Environmental Information 
38. The information that was requested in this case from the Chilean authorities was 
related to the authorization of a foreign investment project with major environmental 
implications. It is therefore relevant to refer here to developments in international and 
comparative law in the special area of access to information on the environment. 
39. Since the adoption of the United Nation’s Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development (1992), access to environmental information has emerged as an 
essential component of sustainable development and public participation in 
environmental decision-making. Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration provides:  
At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information 
concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information 
                                                 
34 The Communiqué expressed the view that “public participation in the democratic and governmental 
process was at its most meaningful when citizens had adequate access to official information.” Quoted in 
“Promoting Open Government: Commonwealth Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Know,” 
Background Paper for the Commonwealth Expert Group Meeting on the Right to Know and the Promotion 
of Democracy and Development (London: March 30-31, 1999). 
 
35 Adopted by the Commonwealth Law Ministers at their May 1999 Meeting, Trinidad and Tobago. 
 
36  Joint Declaration of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OAS 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, 
November 26, 1999. See also the 2004 Joint Declaration of the three mechanisms, adopted on December 6, 
2004, which affirms that “[t]he right to access information held by public authorities is a fundamental 
human right which should be given effect at the national level through comprehensive legislation….” 
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on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to 
participate in decision-making processes.37 
The public’s right to know gains special importance in this area in view of the impact 
of environmental decision-making on the wellbeing and the most basic rights of large 
numbers of people. 
40. Following up on the Rio commitments, the Member States of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe and the European Union signed in Aarhus, 
Denmark, in 1998, the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.38 Article 4 of the 
Convention requires all public authorities of the states parties to make environmental 
information available to the public, upon request, for which there is no need to 
provide a reason. In the Convention’s definition, public authorities include all 
executive and other agencies “performing public administrative functions under 
administrative law.”39 “Environmental information” is also broadly defined to include 
not only technical information on the state of the environment, but also “activities or 
measures, including administrative measures, environmental agreements, policies, 
legislation, plans and programs, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the 
environment.”40 
41. The Rio and Aarhus processes have encouraged many countries to adopt legislation 
providing for a right of access to environmental information, sometimes before even 
recognizing a general right to information. To ensure compliance of its Member 
States with their obligations under the Aarhus Convention, the European Union has 
adopted a number of detailed directives requiring them to enact legislation 
implementing the right at issue.41 
C.  Chile Has Failed to “Give Effect” to the Right to Information 
42. We have respectfully submitted that the victims have a right, under Article 13 of the 
Convention, to seek official information, to which right corresponds a positive 
obligation of the state to provide the requested information. Given the positive nature 
of this obligation, the right is usually guaranteed domestically through the adoption of 
laws or regulations that expressly require public authorities to provide information 
upon request. Such laws often determine in some detail the exceptional grounds on 
                                                 
37  UN Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (vol. 1). 
 
38 UN Doc. ECE/CEP/43, adopted on June 25, 1998. The binding treaty, also known as the Aarhus 
Convention, entered into force on October 30, 2001. It has been ratified by thirty-three countries so far. 
 
39  Aarhus Convention, art. 2.2. 
 
40  Id., art. 2.3(b). 
 
41  See, in particular, Directive 2003/4/EC on Public Access to Environmental Information, January 28, 
2003, which replaced an earlier directive on the matter (Council Directive 90/313/EEC). 
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which official information can be lawfully withheld (usually known as exemptions), 
the procedures for requesting and providing the information, and other practical 
aspects. 
43. At the time of the victims’ informational request to the Committee, Chile did not have 
a law (statute) or other infra-constitutional act of general application providing for a 
general right of access to state-held information. As a result of this lacuna, the 
requestors’ appeals against the Committee’s mute denial of access invoked the free 
expression provisions of the Chilean Constitution and the Convention.42 However, 
their constitutional petitions were summarily rejected as manifestly unfounded by the 
Chilean courts—presumably as a result of a finding that there is no such right of 
access under the Chilean Constitution.  
44. This state of affairs at the relevant time was in violation of Articles 1 and 2 of the 
Convention, read in conjunction with Article 13. Article 1 binds States Parties to 
“ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise” of the 
Convention rights and freedoms. Article 2 complements this obligation by requiring 
States Parties to adopt “such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give 
effect” to Convention rights and freedoms. 
45. The Inter-American Court had an opportunity to expound upon the nature of these 
obligations in its Advisory Opinion on the Enforceability of the Right to Reply and 
Correction, where it argued that Article 2 “codifies a basic rule of international law 
that a State Party to a treaty has a legal duty to take whatever legislative or other steps 
as may be necessary to enable it to comply with its treaty obligations.”43 Turning to 
the specific issue under deliberation, the Court concluded that, 
[i]f for any reason … the right of reply or correction could not be exercised by 
“anyone” who is subject to the jurisdiction of a State Party, a violation of the 
Convention would result which could be denounced to the organs of protection 
provided by the Convention.44 
                                                 
42  The petitioners relied expressly on Article 19.12 and Article 5 of the Chilean Constitution, as well as 
Article 13 of the Convention. Constitutional Article 19.12 guarantees freedom of opinion and information, 
whereas Article 5 obliges all state bodies to respect and promote fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution and by international treaties ratified by Chile. These include the American Convention of 
Human Rights, which was ratified by Chile on August 21, 1990. 
 
43  Advisory Opinion OC-7/86, August 29, 1986, para. 30. 
 
44  Id., para. 28. The Court’s opinion in this instance was requested by Costa Rica, which asked the Court, 
inter alia, whether it had an obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to adopt “the legislative or other 
measures that may be necessary to give effect to the right of reply or correction” guaranteed by Article 14 
of the Convention. In response to this question, the Court concluded, affirmatively, that whenever the 
Convention right at issue “is not enforceable under the domestic law of a State Party”, that State is under an 
obligation to adopt “the legislative or other measures” referred to in Article 2 of the Convention. Id., para. 
35 (emphasis added). 
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46. Likewise, in Chile, the right of access to government information, which we submit is 
guaranteed by Article 13 of the Convention, could not be freely and fully exercised at 
the time of the victims’ request by virtue of that State’s failure to adopt the necessary 
legislative and regulatory measures required to give effect to it. As a result of this 
failure—and as the victims’ unsuccessful appeals to the domestic courts clearly 
demonstrate—the right of access was not enforceable under Chilean law. This 
amounted to a generalized violation of the informational rights of all Chileans and 
others persons under Chile’s jurisdiction, above and beyond those suffered by the 
victims in the current case. 
47. As noted above, in 1999 Chile adopted the Administrative Probity Act, which grants 
public access to “the administrative acts of the state administration bodies and the 
documents that support and complement them directly or essentially.”45 This 
definition of the scope of the right of access is not only vague, but also seriously 
underinclusive. By tying the right of access to the technical category of the 
“administrative act”, the Act excludes a vast amount of records and other information 
in the possession of the state that do not constitute “administrative acts” or may not 
be directly related to final or contentious administrative decision-making.46 The 
excluded records would encompass, for example, all sorts of research data collected 
by government agencies in the fulfillment of their day-to-day responsibilities that 
may not necessarily lead to any “formal administrative decisions.” 
48. Article 2 of the Convention allows the States a certain choice of means in “giving 
effect” to the Convention rights, “in accordance with their constitutional processes 
and the provisions of [the] Convention.” The flawed definition of the 1999 Act is not, 
however, a matter of means of implementation, but of the essential content of the 
right to information. The Act’s definition is based on the erroneous premise that 
access is allowed only to information expressly designated as public, rather than to all 
information that is not specifically exempted from disclosure in the interest of a 
compelling and clearly defined public necessity. In other words, the Act is effectively 
based on the premise of secrecy as the rule, with access as the exception. This would 
be analogous to accepting prior censorship as the rule, and free expression as the 
exception. As a result, in violation of Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention, Chile 
                                                 
45 1999 Act, Article 13.3. The phrase in the Spanish original is “los actos administrativos de los órganos de 
la Administración del Estado y los documentos que le sirven de sustento o complemento directo y 
esencial.” The 1999 Act is complemented by a 2003 law that seeks to clarify various aspects of the 1999 
Act, including the definitions of “administrative act” and “administrative procedure:” Law No. 19.880 
Establishing the Fundamentals of Administrative Proceedings That Govern the Acts of the State 
Administration [Ley que Establece las Bases de los Procedimientos Administrativos que Rigen los Actos 
de los Órganos de la Administración del Estado], published in the Official Journal of May 29, 2003. 
 
46 A 2001 implementing regulation defines administrative acts as “formal decisions issued by the organs of 
the administration, which contain final declarations of will [intent] made in the exercise of a public 
competency” (in original, “decisiones formales que emiten los órganos de la Administración, en las que se 
contienen declaraciones finales de voluntad, realizadas en el ejercicio de una potestad publica”). Supreme 
Decree No. 26 Establishing a Regulation on the Secrecy or Reservation of Acts and Documents of the State 
Administration, published in the Official Journal of May 7, 2001, art. 3. 
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continues not to comply with its obligation to ensure the “free and full exercise” of 
the Article 13 right to government information.  
D.  Chile’s Failure to Disclose the Information Requested by the Victims Violates 
Their Article 13 Rights 
49. The almost complete denial by the Committee, an agency of the Chilean executive, of 
access to the specific information and records requested in this case, coupled with the 
summary dismissals of the victims’ appeals by the domestic courts, amounts to an 
infringement of their right to information. We will turn now to the issue whether such 
infringement was justified under Article 13. From a purely adjudicational perspective, 
Chile’s failure to comply with its “give effect” obligations under Article 2 would 
preclude, or at least render redundant, the review of its compliance with Article 13. 
We will nevertheless continue with a discussion under Article 13 because we believe 
that, even if Chile had given general effect to the right to information, it would still be 
in violation of the Article 13 principles on justified restrictions of the right to 
information. 
50. Under paragraph 2 of Article 13, any restrictions on freedom of expression must be 
“expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure” one of the following 
enumerated aims: 
 
a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or 
b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. 
51. The Inter-American Court has interpreted these provisions as imposing a four-part 
test for the legitimacy of restrictions, which must meet the following requirements: 
 
a. the existence of clearly established grounds for liability; 
b. the express and precise definition of these grounds by law; 
c. the legitimacy of the ends sought to be achieved; 
d. a showing that these grounds of liability are “necessary to ensure” the 
aforementioned ends.47 
With respect to the last, and often most important, of these requirements, the Court 
noted that proving the “necessity” of restrictions requires a showing of “compelling 
governmental interest … that clearly outweigh[s] the social need for the full 
enjoyment” of Article 13 rights. The “just demands of a democratic society” must 
also guide, as an overarching value, the weighing of these competing 
considerations.48 
                                                 
47  Compulsory Membership Opinion, para. 39. The Court reference to “grounds for liability” is taken from 
paragraph 2 of Article 13, which provides that the exercise of the right to freedom of thought and 
expression “shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability 
….” Liability in this context is analogous to restrictions or exemptions to a positive right, such as the right 
to information, which imposes positive obligations on the state.  
 
48  Id., paras. 44-46. 
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Clearly established by law 
52. As noted above, the requestors never received an official explanation from the 
Committee as to why their request was denied, and their judicial appeals were 
summarily dismissed by the domestic courts. The Chilean government claims that the 
denial of information was justified, but it fails to indicate on the basis of what 
domestic law—apart from a vague reference to “constitutional economic 
guarantees”49—even though it recognizes, unlike the domestic judiciary, that Article 
13 of the Convention guarantees a right of access to information. Under these 
circumstances, we must conclude that the grounds for withholding the information in 
this case were neither expressly established, nor precisely defined by Chilean law. 
This is per se a violation of Article 13. 
53. It is relevant to note here that the great majority of freedom of information laws in 
existence include relatively detailed provisions on the legal grounds for non-
disclosure of information. These provisions, when well-drafted, enable individuals to 
predict with reasonable certainty the contours of their informational rights under the 
law—which is the very reason why the Convention requires that any restrictions to 
rights it guarantees be established by law. 
Legitimate Aims 
54. Chile appears to advance three main lines of defense under Article 13.2, arguing that 
the denial of information was justified in the interest of protecting (a) the 
confidentiality of the foreign investor’s commercial information; (b) the 
confidentiality of the Committee’s activities; and/or (c) Chile’s national economic 
interests.50 The State has not indicated, however, to which parts or categories of the 
requested information each of these supposed justifications apply. This makes it 
difficult to determine whether these aims are legitimate under Article 13. A number 
of general observations can nevertheless be made. 
55. It can be assumed that some of the information requested by the victims may have 
included confidential commercial information provided by Trillium. The withholding 
of this particular information would be justified, in principle, by the “rights of others” 
clause in Article 13.2.  
56. The State’s second argument, on the other hand—that all categories of information 
denied to the requestors were “related to the characteristics of the Committee itself 
and its manner of exercising its private functions”51—is excessively vague and far-
reaching. This argument seems to suggest that every document or information related 
to an agency’s fulfillment of its statutory responsibilities ought to be beyond the 
                                                 
49  Admissibility Report, para. 39. 
 
50  Id., paras. 38-39. 
 
51  Id., para. 38. 
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public’s reach. It is equally unclear what is meant by “private functions” of an 
executive agency. Such a rationale for exemptions is so broad that it is capable of 
excluding virtually all records held by government agencies, because in one way or 
another they are all related to some aspect of their administrative responsibilities. 
Accepting such an argument would negate the essential content of the right to 
information. 
57. Many freedom of information laws and international instruments allow for an 
exemption aimed at protecting the confidentiality of internal government 
deliberations. This is done to ensure that officials can debate issues and share their 
opinions internally in a frank and honest fashion. The Council of Europe’s 2002 
Recommendation, for example, protects “the confidentiality of deliberations within or 
between public authorities during the internal preparation of a matter.” This 
restriction is subject, however, to limitations in time and scope. For example, as is 
obvious from the text of the above declaration, the exemption applies only while a 
matter is under “internal preparation.” Other countries exempt only opinions 
contained in internal government communications, but not factual information (see 
below). We submit that Chile’s second argument invokes a legitimate aim only to this 
extent. 
58. In this regard, withholding of information on internal deliberation grounds could only 
be justified, under Article 13.2 of the Convention, in the interest of “protection of … 
public order.” The Inter-American Court has noted that  
it is possible, within the framework of the Convention, to understand the meaning of 
public order as a reference to the conditions that assure the normal and harmonious 
functioning of institutions based on a coherent system of values and principles.52 
While this may be a rather broad definition of public order, provided by the Court in 
the context of an advisory opinion, it might be understood to appropriately encompass 
in our case protection for the confidentiality of internal government deliberations as 
described above. 
59. Chile’s third argument, based on protection of national economic interests, is also 
sometimes considered a valid ground for withholding government information. The 
Council of Europe’s 2002 Recommendation, for example, lists protection of “the 
economic, monetary and exchange rate policies of the state” among the exemption 
grounds. It is, however, completely unclear in what way the disclosure of the 
information requested by the victims—and what specific part of that information—
would have harmed national economic policies.  
60. In addition, the notion of state economic interests is potentially extremely broad. If 
this notion is not to be permitted to seriously undermine the right to access 
information, it must be interpreted in a clear and narrow manner. Direct and specific 
interests, such as protection of the national currency, are quite different from vague 
and generalized concerns, such as maintaining a positive climate for investment. This 
                                                 
52  Compulsory Membership Opinion, para. 64. 
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interpretation is consistent with the approach chosen by this Commission in its 
Declaration of Principles (see paragraph 63 below). For all these reasons, one must 
conclude that Chile has failed to minimally substantiate its claims under the 
“economic interest” heading.  
Necessity and Proportionality 
61. We turn now to the question of whether Chile’s denial of information in this case, in 
the supposed interest of protecting internal government deliberations and the 
commercial secrets of a third party, can be considered necessary and proportionate in 
a democratic society. As the Inter-American Court has repeatedly said in its analysis, 
referring also to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the 
“necessity” test of Article 13 is stricter than one based on “useful,” “reasonable” or 
“desirable” restrictions, and that it actually requires a showing of a “compelling 
governmental interest” in restricting the right at issue.53 
62. Comparative freedom of information law and practice have developed a two-step 
analysis that should guide decisions regarding the necessity and proportionality of 
restrictions to the right of access. First, information can be withheld only if its 
disclosure is likely to cause significant harm to one of the legitimate aims specified 
by law. Secondly, the anticipated harm must be greater than the public interest in 
disclosing the information—in other words, if a careful balancing of the conflicting 
interests indicates that there is a prevailing public interest in disclosure, the 
information should be made public, despite any lesser harms it may cause.54 
63. A similar, and indeed even stricter, approach has been adopted by this Commission in 
its Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, which allows only for 
“exceptional limitations [to the right of access] that must be previously established by 
law in case of a real and imminent danger that threatens national security in 
democratic societies.” The harm and public interest principles have also been 
incorporated by the Aarhus Convention55 and the Council of Europe’s 2002 
Recommendation,56 as well as many national freedom of information laws.  
64. We submit that Chile’s justifications for its denial of information to the victims fail to 
meet this double test. First of all, the necessity of the restrictions should be examined 
                                                 
53  Id., para. 46. 
 
54  For an analytical summary of comparative law and practice, see ARTICLE 19, The Public’s Right to 
Know: Principles of Freedom of Information Legislation, June 1999, available at: 
http://www.article19.org/docimages/512.htm.  
 
55  Article 3.4 of the Convention provides that a “request for environmental information may be refused if 
the disclosure would adversely effect” the enumerated state interests. In addition, the “grounds for refusal 
shall be interpreted in a restrictive way, taking into account the public interest served by disclosure ….” 
 
56  Under section IV.2 of the Recommendation, “[a]ccess to a document may be refused if the disclosure of 
the information contained in the official document would or would be likely to harm any of the [defined] 
interests, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.” 
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by the authorities on a case-by-case basis, i.e. with respect to every document or piece 
of information requested. It is only by reviewing the nature and content of each 
specific document that the authorities can assess the harm that its disclosure might 
cause and the strengths of the public interest it would serve. The requirement of 
specific assessment of the potential harm is widely accepted as elementary. For 
example, in Kuijer v. Council, the Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities reviewed the European Council’s refusal to provide a Dutch academic 
with documents regarding the asylum situation in a number of non-EU countries. The 
Court ruled in favor of the requestor, holding that the Council, which had claimed an 
“international relations” exemption, had failed to consider in any detail the practical 
effects that the disclosure would have on EU’s relations with those third countries.57 
65. In contrast, the circumstances of this case strongly suggest a wholesale refusal of 
information: the Committee never provided any reasons for its denial, and the 
government’s generalized arguments make no reference to the various types of 
requested documents. For example, the Committee’s formal and final decision giving 
Trillium the “go ahead” is treated no differently from any internal communications 
that may have led to that decision. This approach is inimical to the very notion of 
proportionality. 
66. Another principle, closely related to case-by-case review, is that of partial disclosure, 
which applies to documents containing information that is confidential only in part. In 
such cases, the authorities must grant access to the non-exempted parts of the 
document, to the extent that those can be reasonably segregated.58 This flows directly 
from the principle of minimal infringement of rights, which requires that, in choosing 
the means and methods for the “necessary” restriction of rights, governments have to 
adopt the least invasive alternative.59  
                                                 
 
57  Case T-211/00 [2002] ECR II-Feb. 7. See also JT Corporation v. Commission, Case T-123/99 [2000] 
ECR II-3269, where the Court of First Instance found against the Commission for its failure, in part, to 
assess the potential harms from disclosure with respect to the contents of each requested document, rather 
than entire categories of documents. This was also essential for the Commission to be able to assess 
whether the requestor was entitled to partial access to each document. Para. 46. 
 
58  The Aarhus Convention guarantees partial access whenever the “information exempted from disclosure 
… can be separated out without prejudice to [its] confidentiality” (art. 4.6).  The Council of Europe’s 2002 
Recommendation provides: 
 
If a limitation applies to some of the information in an official document, the public authority 
should nevertheless grant access to the remainder of the information it contains. Any omissions 
should be clearly indicated. However, if the partial version of the document is misleading or 
meaningless, such access may be refused. 
 
In practice, partial access is usually granted by blanking out exempted information in paper documents or 
by leaving blank spaces in electronic documents. 
 
59  In the words of the Inter-American Court, a restriction is necessary only if “it cannot be reasonably 
achieved through a means less restrictive of a right protected by the Convention.” Compulsory Membership 
Opinion, para. 79. 
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67. It is clear that the Committee did not consider partial disclosure in this case. For 
example, it is unimaginable that every piece of information held by the Committee 
regarding Trillium, whether provided by the company itself or another source, was 
genuinely a commercial secret. The same applies to internal communications of the 
Committee.  
68. With respect to the latter issue, comparative law and practice draw two important 
distinctions. The first is temporal: internal discussions are often protected only while 
a decision on the matter is pending, and possibly for a short period thereafter. Once a 
final decision is made, and absent any other legitimate grounds for exemption, 
internal communications must be disclosed. This is clear, for example, from the text 
of the Council of Europe’s 2002 Recommendation, which, as noted above, protects 
the confidentiality of government deliberations only “during the internal preparation 
of a matter.”  
69. The Court of First Instance of the European Communities established a similar 
precedent in British American Tobacco v. Commission, which involved a request for 
information on certain policy discussions within the Commission, including as to the 
position of the various member state delegations on the matter. The Court emphasized 
the fact that the request was made after the matter had been settled, and therefore the 
requestor’s interest in disclosure was stronger than any interests the Commission 
might have in the confidentiality of its past deliberations.60 The same reasoning 
would apply to the present case, given that the victims’ request was made after the 
Committee had already given the go-ahead to the Condor River project.  
70. The second important distinction made in this context has to do with substance: while 
opinions and other subjective judgments made by officials in the course of internal 
deliberations are generally considered confidential, raw data and factual information 
are not.61 The rationale for this distinction is that disclosure of factual information in 
the possession of an agency does not, as a rule, affect the uninhibited and candid 
exchange of opinions among its staff. 
71. For this same reason, national and international courts have adopted a differentiated 
treatment of facts and opinions even where the legislative texts are silent on that 
specific point. For example, the United States Freedom of Information Act (1966), 
one of the earliest freedom of information laws, exempts from disclosure “inter-
agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters” which would not normally be 
available to third parties under common law.62 Interpreting the scope of this 
exemption in EPA v. Mink, the U.S. Supreme Court distinguished between “materials 
                                                 
 
60  Case T-111/00 [2001] ECR II-2997, paras. 56-57. 
 
61 See, inter alia, the Australian Freedom of Information Act (1982), sec. 36.5; the Canadian Access to 
Information Act (1983), sec. 21.1; and the Irish Freedom of Information Act (1997), sec. 20.2(b). 
 
62  5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5). 
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reflecting deliberative or policy-making processes on the one hand, and purely 
factual, investigative matters on the other.” Information of the latter nature must be 
disclosed whenever it can be separated from the rest of the document without 
compromising deliberative confidentiality.63  
72. The EC Court of First Instance reached a similar conclusion in the above-referenced 
JT Corporation case, which involved a request for copies of European Commission 
inspection reports and correspondence with a foreign government. The Commission 
refused access, arguing that its investigative activities relied largely on the 
cooperation and information-sharing of Member States and foreign governments, and 
their confidentiality expectations—a rationale similar to that of the confidentiality of 
internal deliberations. The Court ruled for the requestor, however, relying in part on a 
finding that much of the information at issue consisted of “descriptions and factual 
findings that clearly [did] no harm to inspection and investigation tasks.”64 
73. The information requested in the present case was information produced and 
collected by the Committee in carrying out its “due diligence” and watchdog 
functions with respect to prospective foreign investors. While some of the documents 
at issue might contain opinion and value judgments made by Committee staff, they 
must have also included a significant amount of factual and objective information, 
such as on Trillium’s past compliance with Chilean legislation or its environmental 
track record in projects undertaken within or outside the country. Disclosure of that 
information would not have affected the Committee’s internal deliberations—which, 
in addition, had been concluded at the time of the request—and therefore would have 
caused no harm to any legitimate interests under Article 13.2.  
74. In addition, and apart from the question of harm, the Chilean authorities failed to 
weigh the public interest in the disclosure of the requested information against any 
competing considerations. It is important to recall, in this context, that Terram’s 
request to the Committee came at a moment of intense public debate about the 
environmental sustainability of the Condor River project—an activity that had 
attracted unprecedented scrutiny and criticism from Chilean civil society. The Terram 
Foundation had been for years a leading contributor to that debate, which, at the time 
of the request, was focusing on the need for a more complete assessment of River 
Condor project’s environmental impact. 
75. As already noted, public participation in environmental decision-making has become 
an essential part of sound environmental policies in the democratic world.65 At the 
same time, there can be little meaningful participation in decision-making without 
access to information about processes and activities that affect the environment. 
                                                 
63  410 U.S. 73 (1973), at 89. 
 
64  Para. 47. 
 
65  See inter alia Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration; and the Preamble to the Aarhus Convention: “to be 
able to assert [the right to a healthy environment] and observe [the duty to protect it], citizens must have 
access to information [and] be entitled to participate in decision-making … in environmental matters….” 
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Given what is at stake—including the basic human rights to life and health—denials 
of the right to environmental information can amount, as the Strasbourg Court has 
found in its Article 8 jurisprudence, to violations of international human rights law. 
76. At the international level, the Aarhus Convention contains the most elaborate 
interpretation of the related principles of access and public participation in 
environmental matters. It is relevant here to refer to two provisions of the 
Convention, in particular. The first one imposes on the States Parties a general 
obligation to “[p]rovide in an appropriate form information on the performance of 
public functions … relating to the environment by government at all levels.”66 A 
more specific provision in Article 6—which deals with public participation in 
decision-making, including with respect to environmental impact assessments—
provides: 
Each Party shall require the competent public authorities to give the public concerned 
access for examination … to all information relevant to the decision making [about 
proposed activities that may have a significant effect on the environment] that is 
available at the time of the public participation procedure….  The relevant 
information shall include … the main reports and advice issued to the public 
authority….67 
77. The information requested by the Terram Foundation would fall under the ambit of 
these provisions. Even though the Committee did not have, strictly speaking, any 
responsibilities on environmental matters, the information at its possession at the time 
was very relevant to the debate on Trillium’s environmental track record, and can 
therefore be equated with environmental information.68 That information would have 
helped Terram and the public at large to assess Trillium’s integrity and the credibility 
of its on-paper commitments to sustainable development. 
78. In view of the above, it is clear that the victims’ request was supported by a strong 
public interest in disclosure, which should have been weighed against any legitimate 
confidentiality interests—to the extent that any such interests existed with respect to 
some of the requested information, such as third-party commercial secrets or truly 
deliberative internal exchanges. By failing to take into account the public interest in 
disclosure, as the record suggests, the Chilean authorities fell once again short of the 
necessity and proportionality requirements of Article 13. 
                                                 
 
66  Art. 5.7(c).  
 
67  Art. 6.6 (emphasis added).  The Convention defines “the public concerned” as including “non-
governmental organizations promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements under 
national law.” Art. 2.5. 
 
68  As already noted, the Aarhus Convention has adopted a broad definition of environmental information, 
which includes any information on “activities or measures, including administrative measures, … affecting 
or likely to affect the elements of the environment”, such as “soil, land, landscape and natural sites.” Art. 
2.3. 
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III.  Conclusion 
79. We have respectfully submitted that the “freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas” guaranteed by Article 13 of the Convention, includes a 
general right of access to state-held information. We have further submitted that Chile 
has not complied with its Article 1 and 2 obligations to ensure the free and full 
exercise of that right within its jurisdiction, in part by virtue of its failure to give 
effect domestically to the right of access, through legislative or other appropriate 
means. 
80. With respect to the facts of the present case, we submit that Chile has violated the 
victims’ rights under Article 13 in multiple respects. The denial of the requested 
information had no basis in law and, with respect to much of that information, did not 
serve any legitimate aim. Finally, it cannot be considered to be a necessary and 
proportionate restriction of the right to information.  
Respectfully submitted, 
 




James A. Goldston      Darian K. Pavli 
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